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SUBJECT: Darfur Peace Agreement: Seizing the Opportunity

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: To ensure a lasting and just peace, the USG must move quickly to support the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and help the African Union (AU) establish its institutions. The DPA outlines some ambitious timelines and requires AU action in almost all areas. The security provisions in the agreement will most quickly deliver a peace dividend and create a positive environment for recovery and reconstruction. The AU will require significant support from the international community to make this happen. For power sharing, the immediate need is to broaden the support for the agreement. Under wealth sharing, an increase in the delivery of food and humanitarian supplies will show the immediate and tangible benefits of the agreement. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations should also begin soon as a confidence-building measure. The most effective way to support the groups that signed the agreement is not to promote them personally, but to ensure the success of the agreement. END SUMMARY.

Security Arrangements: No Time to Lose

¶2. (U) The AU is charged with monitoring and verifying the provisions of the ceasefire. From the entry into force of the agreement (D-Day), the AU has 3 days to ensure cessation of hostilities and reconstitute the Cease-Fire Commission. They have 6 days to develop a policing plan, and 37 days to develop a plan to disarm the Janjaweed, begin patrolling the buffer zones, and establish the boundaries of the militia areas of control. The AU then has 60 days to begin planning for security sector reform, 65 days to neutralize the Janjaweed and other militias, 69 days to establish logistics distribution points, and 77 days to limit parties to their area of control. And that is just a partial list from Phase I of VI.

¶3. (SBU) To effectively support the AU in meeting these goals, the USG must provide both logistical and advisory support. The Department of Defense is adding another 8 military observers (MILOBs) to assist and advise AU peacekeeping troops. This will bring the total number to ¶16. Once deployed, the 16 MILOBs will be spread to two per AMIS sector. It is recommended that the total number of U.S. MILOBs increase to 35. This number provides for one MILOB in each AMIS camp, one senior MILOB reporting to the AMIS Force Commander, one MILOB to support AMIS Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and one MILOB to support and back-up the senior MILOB.

¶4. (SBU) In collaboration with the Department of Defense, the strategy should also include engaging the

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in a constructive military-to-military dialogue to increase SAF confidence in U.S. and NATO forces. This should include a series of visits by senior-level U.S. military representatives to engage in discussions with senior SAF leaders and to visit AMIS and UNMIS. Additional military options to support the DPA will follow by classified septel.

Power Sharing: Broad Support, Functioning Institutions

15. (U) The AU is currently working with parties that did not sign the agreement, most notably Abdul Wahid, to broaden support for the DPA. The USG can support this effort by helping deliver a simple message that clearly communicates how the peace agreement will deliver freedom from fear and want. The USG can also assist the Government of Sudan (GoS) in establishing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) which serves as the main voice of the people. The TDRA must be established within 21 days of the entry into force of the agreement.

16. (SBU) Most civil society and intellectual leaders of Darfur are still forming their final opinions on the peace agreement. There is a narrow window of opportunity to influence their decisions by communicating the true content of the peace accord. The Charge d'Affaires is leading a media outreach that includes an interview with the largest independent Arabic-language newspaper, the production of a radio program through USAID, and the development of a concise fact sheet in Arabic that addresses the concerns of the people and dispels common myths. The Charge is also meeting with prominent Fur

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leaders in Khartoum, and USAID is investigating the possibility of collaborating with local groups to do small, community-based outreach programs in Darfur.

17. (SBU) The AU will need a public information office to promote the agreement and distribute non-partisan information. They will also require a secretariat to coordinate the intense schedule of meetings the DPA requires. Currently, the AU lacks the capacity to perform either function. The USG could provide the resources and personnel to help the AU establish these offices. This may also be an opportunity for the UN to provide technical support, which could ease a transition to a UN operation.

18. (SBU) Because Mini Minawi is from a minority ethnic group, his ability to rally broad support for the DPA will be limited. While he will inevitably receive significant benefit from signing the DPA-- only signatories to the agreement will be able to fill its positions-- the AU needs to find a way to deliver the message using spokespeople with a broader appeal.

Wealth Sharing: First Keep People Alive

19. (U) The DPA outlines a variety of mechanisms for assisting with the recovery and reconstruction, but the first priority is to better deliver food aid and humanitarian supplies. The goal of peace is to improve the lives of the people of Darfur, and a demonstrable increase in the delivery of aid can show the immediate benefits of the agreement.

110. (U) Within the first 30 days, both the Darfur window in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund should be created. The DPA also calls for a donor conference within 3

months. The Netherlands have taken the lead on the donor conference, but the USG should start immediate planning to assist with these functions.

¶11. (SBU) As a signatory to the agreement, the increased security in Minawi-controlled areas due to a cessation of hostilities should allow for easier access from humanitarian agencies and create the proper environment for recovery and reconstruction. However, any effort to directly tie humanitarian support to participation in the agreement is against the basic principles of humanitarian aid and jeopardizes the entire humanitarian response. Delivery of humanitarian assistance must be based upon need alone.

Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Can Build Confidence

¶12. (SBU) The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations (DDDC) gives a voice to the people of Darfur, many of whom were not part of the Abuja negotiations. It can lend credibility to the DPA and provide an effective channel for peace-building and the dissemination of information. The AU is looking for a prominent international leader to head this commission. Once this person is selected, the USG could offer expertise, personnel, and resources to help it become functional and effective.

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